About a month ago I posted
some silly questions about the idea of free will. I really meant to follow it up sooner, and it's not
entirely for laziness that it's taken me this long to do so. We'll get to that in a second.
If
you suspected a tone of an affectation in "Some Stupid Questions About
Free Will," you were right. My mind is already made up about free will:
it doesn't exist.
This isn't a popular position, and
it's gotten me in more than a few heated arguments with friends. I've
noticed two recurrences in these discussions: I can never seem to
articulate my thoughts effectively, and I often get the impression that I
and my friend are hotly disagreeing about a concept that means
something totally different to each of us. I usually walk away
regretting that I hadn't phrased something more clearly, or that we
didn't forestall all further debate until we came to an agreement on
what we talk about about when we talk about free will. Such was
precisely the case when my friend Yen and I stayed up bickering until
2:00 AM one night in early June, bickering and talking over each other
until we finally just agreed to walk away in a mutual huff. After that I
decided it might be best to sit down and arrange my thoughts in writing
so I'd be better prepared the next time somebody says "bullshit" the
next time I express disbelief in free will.
Before we
go any further, one cause for my delay in elaborating on the
original post was that
Jon B.'s
comments took the wind right out of my
sails. Reading them over, I was impressed (and a little envious) at
how well he managed to extemporaneously sum up the ideas I've so often struggled
to articulate myself:
Can
I propose this? Instead of arguing definitions, let the usage of 'Free
Will', 'Choice', 'Action', 'Think', and any of their synonyms be banned.
This allows a more precise argument to be constructed. If reasoning
doesn't work, it's flaws will be more apparent, since it can't hide
behind vague wording, and if an argument does work it's more likely to
be agreed upon.
Everything
that is has come about by a previous thing. A thing doesn't become what
it is by its own power, but by the power of whatever came before it. If
you look at a mathematical function, the result is dependent upon
whatever value is entered in the function as well as the rule of the
function. The physical world is no different (for the most part). The
laws of physics always work the same way, and (besides levels of
uncertainty at a subatomic level,) there is no variation.
The
human brain is just another physical object, and everything it does is
dependent upon what has come before it. If put in the exact same
situation with the exact same circumstances it will do the exact same
thing. Though each person is developed differently because different
actions are experienced by him or her, and therefore will act
differently, the way one is shaped is completely out of one's control.
The processes which shaped this person were out of the processes'
control, and those processes had no control over how they were shaped,
and so on all the way back to the beginning of time.
Now
compare this with your concept of 'Free Will'. If they don't match up,
and if this reasoning is valid, from a completely clinical and objective
perspective, free will does not exist.
Now
practically, this isn't the necessarily case. There are still
'decisions', points where there are multiple hypothetical outcomes, and
when I 'choose', that is, make one of these outcomes reality, I actually
am choosing. However, with the same starting condition the same outcome
will always turn out.
Though
this isn't immediately useful to everyday life, it is still important
to realize all of this, since many of the principles described above
apply to everyday life in a less exact form. People with similar
upbringings will often act similar. People in the same situations will
often do similar things. If they don't, it's usually because an outside
force affected them, contaminating the experiment, so to speak.
(When
I put it in such terms, I feel like this is really obvious. But this
took me years to realize, and no one else has mentioned such things
yet.)
. . . . . . .
The
problem with discussing these sorts of things is that there are two
realities that we must deal with. To provide an example, it's similar to
using a computer. All a computer can do manipulate memory. Every
program is a series of instructions (which are memory themselves) that
when executed modify, move, and erase memory in a specific way. When you
just look at the machine code every program seems to be very linear and
it's difficult to see what all of these commands are doing.
On
the other hand, look at any program you use on a regular basis. It does
not appear to be a whole load of machine code. There is text, color,
pictures, tool bars, etc. There might be a complex user interface with
many different options, or you may be playing a game like Skyrim where
you can do almost anything.
Now
which interpretation is real? Which one is the correct view of a
computer program? Both! There's nothing about the machine code that
makes it less real than the program that is seen, and vice versa. In
fact, for either to be, the other must exist.
The
Universe is a collection of laws that affect various 'things'. The
relationship between these laws and that which they affect is what
ultimately gives us the reality that you and I interpret. The Standard
Model of Physics, which doesn't seem to allow multiple diverging paths
(unless you want to get into string theory and the multiverse, which is
an idea still in its infancy, and it's hard to say whether or not it may
be valid), is no less real than the reality you and I perceive, which
does seem to allow different outcomes to arise depending which path an
entity takes. In fact, they both are dependent upon the other.
So
when there are multiple ways a situation may unfold, and the situation
occurs a specific way as a result of my involvement in it, when from my
perspective it could unfold a completely different way, there was a
choice on my part. I had free will. However, when you look at the
individual fermions and which compose me and everything else, there
appears to be no choice at all.
A
problem occurs when one takes these two realities in at the same time.
Do they seem a bit contradictory? Don't worry, Quantum Mechanics and the
Theory of Relativity don't work together either. They have specific
domains which they apply to, but they shouldn't be used outside of that.
This is the exact same situation. Knowing that the Universe is rather
deterministic (Not really, since elementary particles are somewhat
unpredictable, but that doesn't change the argument), changes nothing
about how one should view life. However, it's still useful to understand
this other reality (if it can be understood), since the reality we are
most familiar with often takes a similar form. (Not always.)
(Note:
I am no Physicist, nor a Philosopher. I do have quite a bit of
experience with the whole being human thing, but who doesn't? There
probably are some inaccuracies with what I said, feel free to correct me
on any of that. I do believe that when you look at anything at as
simple a level as possible, the truth (or something similar to it) will
inevitably be found. Problems arise when one either can't reach the
simplest level, or has broken things down to a simpler, but still
complex level, then proceeds to label it as the simplest level. I don't
believe what we know is the simplest level of things, but I do believe
that it is simple enough that valid conclusions can be made. Correct me
if I'm wrong.)
And there you have it!
Nevertheless,
I'm still compelled to type up some of the various notes I'd jotted
down in preparation for the intended follow-up post where I'd say
everything that Jon ended up saying in the comments section. Looking at
them now, the following spiel is much less succinct than John's and
potentially a little muddle-headed in its reasoning and in need of refining, but it was still
worth a shot (even if the ideas are hardly original). Besides, THIS IS MY BLOG AND I GET TO HAVE THE LAST WORD.
DAMMIT.
So: what do we mean when we talk about free will?
What
I mean when I talk about "free will" is the idea that the individual
human being operates, in some transcendent manner, as a totally
independent and autonomous agent within the physical world. But this is
opaque jargon.
Maybe a better way of putting it would
be to call it the belief that some immaterial, intrinsic "essence,"
whether we call it the "mind," the "soul," the "spirit," or whatever
else, is the original source of human behavior, acting as an ethereal
"pilot" within the organic body. This controlling essence is not subject
to the rigid physical laws of action/reaction and cause/effect that
govern every other particle in the universe. (The very, very small
things in the universe operate under stranger and more inscrutable rule
set than these, but for the time being we will leave them alone.)

I
don't accept this, and this is a decisive juncture in the the
discussion. From here it can turn towards an unresolvable argument about
the existence of the soul. We can only go forward if we agree that
there is no supernatural, metaphysical basis for human behavior or
experience. Otherwise we can only agree to disagree and are better off
changing the subject.
Provided we agree on this point:
"Mind"
is not a physical existence; it is a subjective experience that has a
physiological basis. Biochemistry is only differentiated from inorganic
chemistry in terms of its particular setting. All of the conductive
bodily meat that makes us do things like "perceive" and "think" must
function along the same lines the ordered (but not necessarily
predictable or even observable) exchange of forces from which all
physical phenomena effloresce.
But "mind" is a thing
generally believed in and taken quite seriously. This might be
important, inasmuch as most arguments about "free will" assume the
primacy of "mind" in determining an individual's actions.
I
am not saying that "thinking" is not real. Of course it is. Thinking is
(covert) behavior; it is something we do, just like seeing or moving or
breathing. There is something ineffable about it; but there is
something ineffable in all subjective experience.
I am
not prepared to argue about the physical provenance of the experience of
"mind" or "consciousness," but I don't think it is necessary. It might
suffice to say that the powers of the human brain speak for themselves:
we are a species superlatively capable of acquiring new sorts of
behavior, outstanding problem solvers, excellent at retaining
information (a phrase B.F. Skinner would dislike, but I'm not enough a
biologist or behaviorist to produce the appropriate jargon), and,
perhaps above all, we are extremely perceptive. We talk about
"sentience" as a kind of awareness, superior to that of any other
organism with which we are familiar.
The line of reasoning might run like this:
I
am an intelligent, sentient creature. What this means is that I am
uniquely capable of a kind of acute self-observation. (Certainly most
animals observe themselves. They'd have a hard time doing anything if
the stimuli produced by their own bodies didn't factor into their
behavior.) So: I perceive myself in perpetual action from one moment to
the next; I have the faculties to observe and consider my actions at
present, to speculate on the advantages and disadvantages of actions I
may take in the future, and to also observe my own observations and
considerations. I observe junctures at which exclusive choices of action
must be selected; I am capable of considering these alternatives and
judging which are best; I frequently observe a coincidence between my
perceived preference and the action I observe myself proceeding to
execute.
From this coincidence I might conclude that the source of my actions is the same faculty through which I observe my actions.

I
hope it is not too much a leap of logic to claim that observation and
conception are of the same provenance. The organ is the brain and
nervous system; these days we usually use words like "mind," "psyche,"
or "consciousness" to describe the subjective experience. "I" (whatever
"I" am) am ultimately in control over this thing or essence; or
otherwise, this thing or essence is actually what "I" am.
I
am also aware of a sense of "freedom." I recognize the future as
uncertain and unformed, a space in which my actions have not yet
occurred. Between the present instant and the future, it is unknown what
action I might take; therefore my potential actions are conceivably
illimitable. If they are conceivably illimitable, they must
be
illimitable. Anything I might conceivably do in any future moment is
something I might actually do at some future moment. At every next
instant (or any future moment or span in time) there is an illimitable
number of things I conceive I might do, and so my faculty of conception
has executive choice in what I choose to do, and my faculty of
conception is either what "I" identify as, or something over which my
core essence has control.
At a given moment, any given
moment, I (whatever "I" am) the primum mobile of my own behavior. My
actions are absolutely volitional; the only mitigating vectors can be
the external physical circumstances of a given instant.
The
first error, I think, is that in a given instant, the ineffable
subjective experience called consciousness through which we experience
reality bears no obvious markings of any occasion prior to the immediate
present. Our perceptions are restricted to the present.
We
are shaped by perpetual cascades of circumstance of which we can only
recall infinitesimal fractions. Even at the moment of occurrence, we
cannot consciously perceive the whole of it. The greater part of our
lives escapes our notice. So to say we observe and can recall every
muscle twitch, stray thought, quickening heartbeat, etc. is obviously
false. We are incapable of accurately conceiving our personal continuity
in its entirety.

There can be no "free will" if we are constrained by circumstances at every instant;
circumstances that are the immediate consequence of an incomprehensibly
abstruse chain of causality within an ordered (yet unfathomably complex)
physical universe.
The person I am at any given moment
exists in the latest instant of an unbroken continuity. "Mind" is a
moot point as long as we agree that its existence and character are
dependent on structures and processes within the body. (If it weren't,
the pharmaceutical industry wouldn't have much of a selling point for
their products, and narcotics would enjoy far less popularity.) There is
not a single moment when the essential "I" (my core personal essence,
my mind, my psyche, my soul) can put on the brakes and redirect my
behavior in such a way that
is no way the next logical step in the contiguous history of the organism that I am.
I
can only do what I do. What I do during a given instant is the only
thing I can do at that instant. Any appearance of spontaneity or
randomness should be attributed to the limitations of our perception and
understanding of human physiology.
The validity of the
concept of "free will" (as we attempted to define it above) is inversely
proportionate to the validity of physical determinism, and we have very
good reason to believe that our world is for the very most part nonrandom -- that all (or extremely close to all) observable events
logically proceed from prior events.
(Note: I don't
think that determinism necessarily equates to predestination. The latter
implies the existence of an original, intelligent (as can be understood
anthropically) architect of each and every last smallest physical
quantity's movement across and throughout a span of what we can
effectively call Eternity; in other words, that a deliberate
plan is being followed. The former does not.)
But yeah. There's that thing about quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle.
On
the quantum scale (wherein the basic yardstick for physical dimensions
is 1/1,000,000,000 of a meter) the particles of the flashes in our
electric brains behave in ways that we cannot predict, and are evidently
random. This apparent lapse in determinism is sometimes cited as
grounds to affirm the truth of our experience of free will.
Well...

1.)
If you don't have an advanced degree, you shouldn't make any statements
about quantum physics or its implications because you do not know what
you are talking about. I do not have an advanced degree. I really don't
know what I am talking about and would appreciate any appropriate
corrections where my thoughts might be mistaken (at least about physics,
I mean).
2.) That said, I question the degree to which
quantum events "scale" up to the world of our own experience. My
understanding of it is more or less that the evident randomness of
quantum-scale events very rarely have an appreciable effect in the realm
of our experience. After all, if "macroscopic" events were subject to
quantum indeterminacy at every turn, this whole argument would be moot.
The physical world would be too inconsistent to allow for advanced
organic life, let alone a human civilization with a sophisticated
communications network. I wouldn't be typing this, you wouldn't be
reading it.
3.) Say that quantum uncertainty
does
influence our behavior in a significant way (and who is to say it does
not?): on what grounds can we claim that quantum events are caused by us
(or our minds), and not the reverse? Saying that I (the essential "I")
regulate the quantum activity within my body by a transcendent effort of
will rather seems a case of confusing cause with effect.
It
is more likely that "we" (all of the essential "I"s, our sentient
cores) contribute to our own behavior largely as oberservers of
ourselves; not movers.
This is not to say that
perception has no bearing on behavior. Our perceptions are the pathways
through which our environment asserts its control over us. We are
constantly changed by our experiences. This is evident in what we
observe in our thoughts and our beliefs.
I believe what
I believe as the result of my environment. If I believed something
different, I would behave much differently. (Or: if I behaved much
differently, I would believe something different?) If we have two copies
of the very same human being from the very exact same moment and time,
identical except for a small difference in moods, the copies would not
be identical. Their physiology is different -- very small and subtly
different, but of enough behavioral significance to change the way they
might respond to their environment at a given moment.

For instance: a person who believes that his choices
are important and his actions
do
matter (but we never said they did not) might be more capable of
effective behavior than a person whose shiftlessness is marked by an
expressed belief that nothing he does makes a difference.
(Again:
does the difference in attitude cause the subtle difference in
physiology, or vice versa? This is not a question I can address.)
In
this world, knowing what we do, and being what we are, it might be
useful to overlook the paradox and simultaneously believe both "I am
free to act in the world and responsible for my actions" and "I am
purely a haphazard product of my genes and environment."
We cannot currently afford to accept only one at the expense of the other.
NEXT: Implications.*
(Whenever I perform these exercises in amateur sophistry, comments and
criticisms are duly appreciated. I'd rather be corrected than mistaken.)
* read: "next or soon or later."